Notes On Science and Our Crisis: Modification of Max Horkheimer’s Essay by Incorporating Elements of the Worldview of Islam, Towards an Islamic Critical Theory

Edited by M. Miftahul Firdaus

If Max Horkheimer begins his essay by stating the theory of Marxism about society and knowledge (Horkheimer, 2002:3), I would like to start this essay by stating the formulations about the concept of society and knowledge in Islam. This is because Islam is a unique and integral system of worldview and civilization. Islam can have both similarities and differences with both side of socialism and capitalism, egalitarianism and individualism, rationalism and empiricism, materialism and idealism, feminism and anti-feminism, modernism and postmodernism, and all other dualisms or polar opposites in Western thought; but Islam stands alone as a worldview and philosophical system. Even if there are similarities with the two polar sides, it is only because of the universal nature of Islam and because Islam occupies a position of fair middle ground between those extremes (Izetbegovic, 1993: xxxi). Therefore, in looking at various aspects of civilization and life, we must use the prism of views that are purely Islamic; and we should not associate Islam with any -ism in the secular philosophy because, once again, Islam has its own metaphysical system, worldview, paradigm, and civilization structure. (Zarkasyi, 2010: 2; Izetbegovic, 1993: xviii-xix)

Islamic Theory of Knowledge

In the Islamic theory of existence, knowledge, human and society; science is not the only valid knowledge. I say this not to discredit ‘the modern notion of science,’ but so that we can get a comprehensive image of reality according to the worldview of Islam. Actually, we don’t need to dichotomize/discriminate all types of knowledge at all, because “all knowledge comes from God” (al-Attas, 1993:144). However, for the purpose of classification, we can say that in the same manner that man is of a dual nature possessed of souls (rational soul and animal soul) and body, so is knowledge of two kinds: the one is food and life for the souls and the other is provision with which man might equip himself in the physical world in his pursuit of pragmatic ends (al-Attas, 1993:144). And science, in its contemporary ratio-empirical understanding, belongs to the second type of knowledge.

According to the Islamic theory of knowledge, the first kind of knowledge is given by God through revelation to human; and this refers to the Holy Quran. The Holy Quran is the knowledge par excellence (al-Attas, 1993: 144–145). The first kind of knowledge also includes the Sunnah of God’s Prophet and Messenger, who may God Bless and give Peace. It is his manner of interpreting God’s Law (Shariah, sharīʿah) in daily life and practice. The Divine Law is embodied in the Holy Quran and manifested in word (qawl), model action (fiʿil), and silent confirmation (taqrīr) in the Sunnah which includes spiritual knowledge (ʿilm al-ladunnīyy) and wisdom (ḥikmah). So then, the Holy Quran, the Sunnah, the Shariah, ʿilm al-ladunnīyy and ḥikmah are the essential elements of the first kind of knowledge (al-Attas, 1993:145).

The second kind of knowledge refers to knowledge of the sciences (ʿulūm), and is acquired through experience, observation, and research. It is discursive and deductive, and it refers to objects of pragmatical value. This type of knowledge is given by God to man through speculation and rational effort of enquiry based on his experience of the sensible and intelligible. It refers to knowledge of sensible and intelligible data acquired (kasbī) for our use and understanding (al-Attas, 1993:146). Thus, science belongs to the second type of knowledge. However, the purpose of science in Islam is not only pragmatical. It is not only regarded as one of man’s productive powers (Horkheimer, 2002: 3). It is more comprehensive and integral than what Horkheimer understood.

The Aim of Science in Islamic Perspective

The ultimate goal of science in Islam is to reach certain knowledge (al-ʿilm al-yaqīn) about Absolute Truth, about the Highest Reality, about the noumena aspects (noumenon) behind phenomena (phenomenon), about the meaning of human beings and the meaning of nature, about gratitude and self-devotion to the Creator, all of which are aspects of recognition and understanding of the higher levels of Reality according to what humans can achieve. As for the aspect of the instrumentality of science and technology in building the prosperity of life in this mortal world, it is only an intermediary characteristic (a means, waṣīlah) in order to achieve a more fundamental and noble goal: manifesting gratitude to God in thought, speech and practice. (Setia, 2016:49)

The Contemplative-Metaphysical Goal

The first kind of knowledge unveils the mystery of Being and Existence and reveals the true relationship between man’s self and his Lord, and since for man such knowledge pertains to the ultimate purpose for knowing, it becomes the basis and essential foundation for knowledge of the second kind. Science alone, without the guiding spirit of the former knowledge, cannot truly lead man in his life, but only confuses and confounds him and enmeshes him in the labyrinth of endless and purposeless seeking (al-Attas, 1993:146). Science thus has two goals: to meet the practical and pragmatic needs of man, and to support his efforts to uncover the meanings that exist in the universe as an unfolding book which is a sign for the Existence and Power of the ‘Author’, the Creator.

The Universe and Cosmic Order as Āyāt

The World of Nature, as depicted in the Holy Quran, is like a Great Book; and every detail therein, encompassing the farthest horizons and our very selves, is like a word in that Great Book that speaks to man about its Author. The word as it-really-is is a sign, a symbol; and to know it as it-really-is is to know what it stands for, what it symbolizes, what it means. To study the word as word, regarding it as if it had an independent reality of its own, is to miss the real point of studying it, for regarded as such it is no longer a sign or a symbol, as it is being made to point to itself, which is not what it really is. For as it-really-is, a thing or an object of knowledge is other than what it is, and that ‘other’ — at least at the rational and empirical level of normal experience — refers to its meaning (al-Attas, 1993:146). Thus, all kinds of knowledge, including science, must lead to obtaining the meaning of the Total Reality.

It is clear that the disenchantment of nature understood in the sense derived from the historical development of secular philosophy and science is most certainly opposed to the Islamic view of nature. The Holy Quran declares in no uncertain terms that the whole of nature is as it were a great, open Book to be understood and interpreted. The Holy Quran also says that those among mankind who possess intelligence, insight, understanding, discernment, knowledge, know the meaning of that Book, for nature is like a book that tells us about the Creator; it ‘speaks’ to man as a revelation of God. The Holy Quran’s description of nature and man — both in their outward manifestation and their inward hiddenness — as āyāt (words, sentences, signs, symbols) is self-explanatory in that respect. Nature has cosmic meaning and must, because of its symbolical connection with God, be respected. Man according to the Holy Quran is God’s vicegerent (khalīfah) and inheritor of the Kingdom of Nature. This does not mean that he should be presumptuous enough to regard himself as “co-partner with God in creation”. He must treat nature justly; there must be harmony between him and nature. Since he has been entrusted with the stewardship of the Kingdom of Nature which belongs to God, he must look after it and make legitimate use of it, and not ruin and spread chaos over it. If nature is like a great, open Book then we must learn the meaning of the Words in order to discern their tentative and final purposes and enact their biddings and invitations and instructions to beneficial use in such wise that we may come to know and acknowledge in grateful appreciation the overwhelming generosity and wisdom of the incomparable Author (al-Attas, 1993: 38–39).

It is not strange to think of the universe as a book or document containing symbols and signs for scientists to interpret. Even great figures in physics, which is considered one of the most exact sciences, such as Max Planck thought so. The ideal aim before the mind of the physicist is to understand the external world of reality. But the means which he uses to attain this end are what are known in physical science as measurements, and this give no direct information about external reality. They are only a register or representation of reactions to physical phenomena. As such they contain no explicit information and have to be interpreted. As Helmholtz said, measurements furnish the physicist with a sign which he must interpret, just as a language expert interprets the text of some prehistorical document that belongs to a culture utterly unknown. The first thing which the language expert assumes — and must assume if his work is to have any practical meaning — is that the document in question contains some reasonable message which has been stated according to some system of grammatical rules or symbols. In the same way the physicist must assume that the physical universe is governed by some system of laws which can be understood, even though he cannot hold out to himself the prospect of being able to understand them in a comprehensive way or to discover their character and manner of operation with anything like a full degree of certidude.” (Planck, 1913: 84)

With regard to that interpretation activity, science according to Islam is ultimately a kind of ta’wīl or allegorical interpretation of the empirical things that constitute the world of nature. As such science must base itself firmly upon the tafsīr or interpretation of the apparent or obvious meanings of the things in nature. Their apparent and obvious meanings have to do with their respective places within the system of relations; and their places become apparent to our understanding when the limits of their significance are recognized. Ta’wīl basically means getting to the ultimate, primordial meaning of something through a process of intellection. But even in this case, there are things whose ultimate meanings cannot be grasped by intellect, and those deeply rooted in knowledge accept them as they are through true belief which we call īmān. This is the position of truth in that there are limits to the meaning of things, and their places are profoundly bound up with the limits of their significance. Limitation is not a shortcoming. Our external and internal senses and faculties of imagination and cognition all have limited powers and potentials, each created to convey and conserve information concerning that for which it was appointed. There is pragmatic purpose in limitation, for by it we are able to perceive and conceive objects of knowledge and ideas about them and their relations so that we may put the knowledge of things to beneficial use. The setting of limits to the channels and sources by which we obtain knowledge is therefore a blessing and a mercy from God in order that we may be able to understand the meanings of the objects of knowledge as well as to recognize the Creator (al-Attas, 1995: 137–139).

Furthermore, viewed as a text, nature is a fabric of symbols, which must be read according to their meaning. The Quran is the counterpart of that text in human words; its verses are called āyāt, just as are the phenomena of nature. Both nature and the Quran speak forth the presence and the worship of God: We shall show them Our portents on the horizon and within themselves until it will be manifest unto them that it is the Truth (Q 41:53) (Nasr, 2001: 24). All beings in the universe, to begin with, are Muslim, i.e., “surrendered to the Divine Will.” … Secondly, all men who accept with their will the sacred law of the revelation are Muslim in that they surrender their will to that law (Nasr, 2001: 23). Allah has given each created being its own measure (qadr) and nature (fiṭrah). Allah establishes the Laws (SunnatuLlāh / Sunnat Allāh) that govern the cosmic order (Wirjosandjojo, 1984: 284; Younos, 2011: xiv-xv). Every component of the universe then without exception obeys the Order (amr) outlined by God, since each component of the universe has a “consciousness”, and with that awareness they realize Allah’s Power over them, the most reasonable choice for them is to recognize and obey God’s Order (al-Kindi, 1950: 246; Wirjosandjojo, 1984: 284–286).

Emulation of Cosmic Order as Individual and Social Order

However, different from the totality of cosmic entities that always obey God’s Commandments, humans have elements within themselves that can distort them from that Order, especially forgetfulness (nisyān) and lust (hawā). That’s why Allah sent Messengers and sent down Revelations as life guides and reminders for humans on an ongoing basis from Prophet Adam PBUH to Prophet Muhammad PBUH. Just as God’s Order governs the universe at the cosmic level, the Revelations and teachings of the Apostles are intended as an Order that governs human beings at the individual and social levels, so that human beings can live to realize a certain order and civilization that reflects the order of the cosmos. In this way, humans are expected to become the microcosmic representation of the macro-cosmos. The Dīn and the Tamaddun of Islam (i.e., the religion-worldview and the civilization-socio-cultural foundation of all the Prophets and Messengers) is then an emulation of the pattern or form according to which God governs His Kingdom; it is an imitation of the Cosmic Order manifested here in this worldly life as individual, social, economical, legal, as well as political order. The social order of Islam encompasses all aspects of man’s physical and material and spiritual existence in a way which, here and now, does justice to the individual as well as the society; and to the individual as a physical being as well as the individual as spirit (al-Attas, 1995: 55).

So, once again, the ultimate goal of all knowledge — including science — in Islam is to achieve awareness of the totality of the order of existence (i.e., total reality) created and controlled by God; then on the basis of that awareness, acknowledging the Existence, Authority and Oneness of God; as well as practicing the knowledge and the recognition to manifest justice by positioning human beings in a fair or just manner, namely carrying out the system of rules and order that have been established by God in daily life and in carrying out the task of managing the world and society — just like the cosmos operates to fulfill His rules and order (Setia, 2016: 49). In other words, the purpose of that awareness, knowledge, and recognition is to place human beings fairly in the cosmic order, or to become a “microcosmic representation of the macro-cosmos” (al-Attas, 1993: 141–143). In other word, the aim of all the Islamic sciences is to show the unity and inter-relatedness of all that exists, so that, in contemplating the unity of the cosmos, man may be led to the unity of the Divine Principle, of which the unity of nature is the image, in which one can contemplate the Divine Unity manifesting itself in multiplicity (Nasr, 2001: 21–22).

The Practical and Pragmatic-Instrumental Goal

Despite having a metaphysical goal of knowledge and science, Islam does not forget the practical and pragmatic-instrumental aspects of knowledge and science. However, this instrumentality is not the ultimate goal of acquiring knowledge and science, but only a means / ware / way to be able to cultivate nature and to manage individual and society according to the provisions outlined by God. This is because in the Islamic conception, humans are God’s caliphs — one of the meanings of a caliph is a representative, vicegerent (al-Attas, 1995: 56) — who is sent down to earth to manage nature according to God’s Will and Pleasure. This is reflected in the Islamic conception of life, namely that the orientation of human life is to achieve happiness in the Hereafter by managing and utilizing various facilities in this world in the way of virtue (Setia, 2016: 48–52).

The Ultimate Standard of Truth

The fact that science contributes to the social life-process as a productive power and a means of production in no way legitimates a pragmatist theory of knowledge. The fruitfulness of knowledge indeed plays a role in its claim to truth, but the fruitfulness in question is to be understood as intrinsic to the science and not as usefulness for ulterior purposes. The test of the truth of a judgment is something different from the test of its importance for human life. It is not for social interests to decide what is or is not true (Horkheimer, 2002:3). Instead, the criterion of truth in Islamic conception is in accordance with or at least does not violate the standard concepts contained in Revelations (Quran and Sunnah).

That is because “knowledge is not entirely a property of the human mind, and that the sciences derived from it are not the products solely of unaided human reason and sense experience possessing an objectivity that preclude value judgment, but that knowledge and the sciences need guidance and verification from the statements and general conclusions of revealed Truth. If knowledge and the sciences that grow from a civilization — thus reflecting its metaphysical system and worldview — are not aligned to the statements and general conclusions of revealed Truth, then what it takes to be true may not always be truly so, nor what is taken to be real to be really so; and such interpretation must therefore undergo recurrent corrective revision necessitating what is called ‘paradigm shifts’ which involve also changes in the worldview and the metaphysical system that projects it” (al-Attas, 1995: ix).

Worldview and Metaphysics as The Foundation of Knowledge

Science may not be deprived of its own proper character and misinterpreted for only utilitarian ends (Horkheimer, 2002: 3–4), as understood in the materialistic type of philosophy and civilization. The conception and conceptualization of knowledge and the sciences, as well as the adaptation of methods and theories, are in each civilization formulated within the framework of its own metaphysical system forming its worldview. Each metaphysical system, and thus also the worldview it projects, is not the same for every other civilization; it differs from one another in accordance with differences in the interpretation of what is taken to be ultimately true and real (al-Attas, 1995: ix). Thus, the aim of science and knowledge is something more than just in the realm of instrumental and it is also not restricted to the mere description of bare facts of observational or experimental discovery. The aim of science and knowledge is something that is essentially metaphysical. (Planck, 1913: 82–83)

Even though we oppose the pragmatist theory of knowledge, we do not completely deny the utilitarian and pragmatic elements in science. In the same way that while we reject rationalism and positivism, we also acknowledge the validity of rational and empirical elements in science. What we oppose is the attitude of limiting knowledge and science only to partial aspects, as practiced by the proponents of pragmatism, rationalism, empiricism, and other notions like that. In contrast, knowledge and science in Islamic perspective are integral, reflecting the main teachings in Islam itself, tawhīd (monotheism) or the Unity of God and the Unity of Reality. The representatives of Islamic thought — theologians, philosophers, scientists, metaphysicians — have all and individually applied various methods in their investigations without preponderating on any one particular method. They combined in their investigations, and at the same time in their persons, the empirical and the rational, the deductive and the inductive methods and affirmed no dichotomy between the subjective and the objective, so that they all affected what I would call the tawhīd method of knowledge. (al-Attas, 1995: 3) Indeed, one of the important similarities between Islamic position and that of contemporary Western philosophy and science is the combination of realism, idealism, and pragmatism as the cognitive foundation of a philosophy of science (al-Attas, 1995: 118) Furthermore, we do not agree with those who take the position that reality and truth, and values derived from them, are separate, and that they articulate their meanings within the paradigms of relativity and plurality having equal validity (al-Attas, 1995: ix). In Islamic conception, the realities and essences of things are established or exist in reality and that the knowledge of them is realized or verifiable as real, in contradiction to the sophists and the relativists (haqāiq al-ashyā’ thābitah wa-l-ʿilm bihā mutaḥaqqiq khilāfan li-s-sūfasṭāiyyah, an-Nasafi according to interpretation of al-Attas, 1988: 65 and Harvey, 2021: 8).

The Inseparability of Knowledge from Human Thought and Action

Of course, the reasons which justify rejecting the pragmatist theory of knowledge and relativism in general, do not lead to a positivist separation of truth and action. Neither the direction and methods of theory nor its object, reality itself, are independent of man. (Horkheimer, 2002: 4) Indeed, what is formulated and disseminated in and through institutions of learning, knowledge, and science is in fact knowledge and science infused with the character and personality of human culture and civilization, so that knowledge and science itself is not neutral; instead, it is infused with key concepts and elements of human culture and civilization (al-Attas, 1993: 162) projected by its worldview. These elements and key concepts are mainly prevalent in that branch of knowledge pertaining to the human sciences, although it must be noted that even in the natural, physical and applied sciences, particularly where we deal with interpretation of facts and formulation of theories, human worldview has impacts; for the interpretations and formulations indeed belong to the sphere of the human science (al-Attas, 1993: 162; Zarkasyi, 2016: 24; Kuntowijoyo, 2007: 38 & 51–52; Rousseau, 2018: 7–10), particularly the philosophy of science. On the other hand, knowledge and science itself cannot be separated from human action, since from the point of view of man, both kinds of knowledge have to be acquired through conscious action (ʿamal), for there is no useful knowledge without action resulting from it; and there is no worthwhile action without knowledge (al-Attas, 1993: 147). Therefore, in Islamic point of view, theory and action cannot be separated, unlike its historical separation phenomenon within the Western secular system of knowledge (Horkheimer, 2002: 4). Since it is man that perceives and conceives the world of objects and events external to him, the study of nature includes man himself (al-Attas, 1995: 116).

Subjectivity in Natural Science

Indeed, some of the Western scientists and thinkers also realize that science and knowledge cannot be separated from the subjective aspects of human thought. In the natural sciences, Werner Heisenberg recognized that in classical physics, science started from the belief — or should one say from the illusion — that we could describe the world or at least parts of the world without any references to ourselves … Its success has led to the general ideal of an objective description of the world. Objectivity has become the first criterion for the value of any scientific result. Does the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory still comply with this ideal? Certainly, quantum theory does not contain genuine subjective features, since it does not introduce the mind of the physicist as part of the atomic event. But it starts from the division of the world into the object and the rest of the world, and from the fact that at least for the rest of the world we use the classical concepts in our description. This division is arbitrary and historically a direct consequence of our scientific method; then the use of the classical concepts is finally a consequence of the general historical human way of thinking. But this is already a reference to ourselves and in so far, our description is not completely objective (Heisenberg, 1971: 55). This again emphasize a subjective element in the description of atomic events, since the measuring device has been constructed by the observer, and we have to remember that what we observe is not nature in itself but nature exposed to our method of questioning (Heisenberg, 1971: 57). As the modern atomic physics has turned away from the materialistic trend it had during the nineteenth century, quantum theory reminds us, as Bohr has put it, of the old wisdom that when searching for harmony in life one must never forget that in the drama of existence, we are ourselves both players and spectators (Heisenberg, 1971: 57 & 58).

Subjectivity in Social Science

Meanwhile, in social science, namely in Action Theory, Talcott Parsons admits that there are subjective and ultimate/final/end elements that constitute factors of action, thus also source of knowledge in sociology. Parsons established action theory to integrate the study of social action and social order with the aspects of macro and micro factors. In other words, he was trying to maintain the scientific rigour of positivism, while acknowledging the necessity of the “subjective dimension” of human action incorporated in hermeneutic types of sociological theorizing. He sees motives as part of our actions, so that social science must consider ends, purposes and ideals when looking at actions, particularly for the purpose of definition, or that there is essentially a “normative orientation” of action. The frame of reference of the action theory schema is subjective in a particular sense. That is, it deals with phenomena, with things and events as they appear from the point of view of the actor whose action is being analyzed and considered. (Parsons, 1949: 44–46)

Of course, the phenomena of the “external world” play a major part in the influencing of action. But in so far as they can be utilized by this particular theoretical scheme, they must be reducible to terms which are subjective in this particular sense. It may be said that all empirical science is concerned with the understanding of the phenomena of the external world. Then the facts of action are, to the scientist who studies them, facts of the external world — in this sense, objective facts. That is, the symbolic reference of the propositions the scientist calls facts, is to phenomena “external” to the scientist, not to the content of his own mind. But in this particular case, unlike that of the physical sciences, the phenomena being studied have a scientifically relevant subjective aspect. That is, while the social scientist is not concerned with studying the content of his own mind, he is very much concerned with that of the minds of the persons whose action he studies. This necessitates the distinction of the objective points of view — from the scientific observer of action — and the subjective points of view — from the actor. (Parsons, 1949: 46)

Parsons action theory is thus characterized by a system-theoretical approach, which integrated a meta-structural analysis with a voluntary theory. His first major work, The Structure of Social Action discussed the methodological and meta-theoretical premises for the foundation of a theory of social action. It argued that an action theory must be based on a voluntaristic foundation — claiming neither a sheer positivistic-utilitarian approach nor a sheer “idealistic” approach would satisfy the necessary prerequisites, and proposing an alternative, systemic general theory. Parsons shared positivists’ desire for a general unified theory, not only for the social science but for the whole realm of action systems (including the concept of “living systems”). On the other hand, he departed from them on the criteria for science, particularly on Auguste Comte’s proposition that scientists must not look for the “ultimate ends” so as to avoid unanswerable metaphysical questions. Parsons maintained that, at least for the social sciences, a meaningful theory had to include the question of ultimate values, (Parsons, 1935: 283–316) which by their very nature and definition, included questions of metaphysics. As such, his theory stands at least with one foot in the sphere of hermeneutics and similar interpretive paradigms, which become particularly relevant when the question of “ends” must be considered within systems of action-orientation. As such, Parsons can be viewed as at least partially anti-positivist. If we review the book ‘The Structure of Social Action’, we will see how the chapters are structured in such a way as to reflect the shift in Parsons’ analysis from purely positivistic towards a more voluntaristic Theory of Action (Parsons, 1949: 43–74 & 727–777). The discussion on voluntaristic theory of action is important because Islamic thinkers also have their own concepts of action theory, especially from a more metaphysical perspective. Ghazali’s theory of the ethics of action is a modified form of the theory of ethical voluntarism or theistic subjectivism (Hourani, 1976: 77; Gyekye, 1987: 83–91). In classical Islam ethical subjectivism took a theistic approach, by which wājib as applicable to human acts was defined as simply whatever is commanded by God, with the backing of divine sanctions by Rewards and Punishments (Hourani, 1976: 72) or can be considered as theological voluntarism. Other important thinker, al-Kindi, also formulated his own action concepts which essentially metaphysical. In the midst of the domination of secular discourse in sociology, anthropology, and psychology, we must instead develop a more Islamic-oriented investigation, that is towards the metaphysical perspective on the theory of action, with an integral approach in viewing the relationship between individual action, social action, cosmic action, and Divine Action within the framework of Total Action of The Total Reality. Discussion on this topic should be the next research agenda.

Furthermore, Pitirim Sorokin proposed the need for integral system of truth, since for thousands of years many empirical uniformities of natural phenomena were lying under ‘the eyes and ears’ of the organs of the senses; and yet they were unable to grasp them. When they were ‘discovered,’ they were discovered only through the co-operation of other sources of cognition: logic and intuition. When these elementary verities are understood, it becomes clear how limited, poor, incoherent and narrow would be our knowledge, if it were limited to only pure sensory cognition. … Likewise, mere dialectical speculation … or intuition … misleads us much more easily when it is isolated from, and unchecked by, the other sources and systems of truths than when it is united into one integral whole with the others. Hence the greater adequacy of the integral system of truth. (Sorokin, 1941: 763–764) In short, any attempt to explain personal and social reality in terms of ends, purposes, ideals, has been under suspicion as a form of “teleology” which was thought to be incompatible with the methodological requirements of positive science. One must, on the contrary, explain in terms of “causes” and “conditions,” not of ends. Of late years, however, there have been many signs of a break in this rigid positivistic view of things, and a move towards more integral approach of knowledge (Parsons, 1935: 282). And Islam itself proposes for the integral (tawḥīd) view and method of knowledge (al-Attas, 1995: 3). Of course, the integralism referred to by Western thinkers is not entirely the same as integralism from an Islamic perspective, so that Muslims need to formulate alternative integral sciences based on their own worldview and paradigm. This task is very important to carry out, because Muslims are increasingly aware that the Western secular worldview and paradigm contains errors, impurities, and content that is contrary to Islam; so that the contemporary science they produce is permeated by values that some are acceptable, but most of the others are unacceptable or even completely wrong.

The Crisis of Contemporary Science

Horkheimer then realized that knowledge and science which were wrong and not properly functioned would bring crises in life, but he only examined this relationship from economic view. He stated that in the general economic crisis, science proves to be one of the numerous elements within a social wealth which is not fulfilling its function. This wealth is immensely greater today than in previous eras. The world now has more raw materials, machines, and skilled workers, and better methods of production than ever before, but they are not profiting mankind as they ought. Society in its present form is unable to make effective use of the power it has developed and the wealth it has amassed. Scientific knowledge’s application in this respect is sharply disproportionate to its high level of development and to the real needs of mankind. Such a situation hinders the further development, qualitative and quantitative, of science itself. (Horkheimer, 2002: 4)

However, we see the causes of the global crisis from a broader civilizational perspective than just economical. Many challenges have arisen in the midst of man’s confusion throughout the ages, but none perhaps more serious and destructive to man than today’s challenge posed by Western civilization. We maintain that the greatest challenge that has surreptitiously arisen in our age is the challenge of knowledge and science, indeed, not as against ignorance; but knowledge and science as conceived and disseminated throughout the world by Western civilization; knowledge and science whose nature has become problematic because it has lost its true purpose due to being unjustly conceived, and has thus brought about chaos in man’s life instead of, and rather than peace and justice; knowledge which pretends to be real but which is productive of confusion and skepticism, which has elevated doubt and conjecture to the ‘scientific’ rank in methodology and which regards doubt as an eminently valid epistemological tool in the pursuit of truth; knowledge which has, for the first time in history, brought chaos to the Three Kingdom of Nature: the animal, vegetal and mineral (al-Attas, 1993: 133).

One way of hiding the real causes of the present crisis is to assign responsibility for it to precisely those forces which are working for the betterment of the human situation, and this means, above all, rational, scientific thinking. The attempt is being made to subordinate the more intense cultivation of such thinking by individuals to the development of the “psychic” and to discredit critical reason as a decisive factor except for its professional application in industry. The view is abroad that reason is a useful instrument only for purposes of everyday (pragmatic) life, but must fall silent in face of the great problems and give way to the more substantial powers of the soul. The result is the avoidance of any theoretical consideration of society as a whole. The struggle of contemporary metaphysics against scientism is in part a reflection of these broader social tendencies. (Horkheimer, 2002: 4)

The error and confusion in worldview, knowledge, and science will create the condition of the loss of adab within the Community. The concept of adab refers to recognition and acknowledgement of the right and proper place, station, and condition in life and to self-discipline in positive and willing participation in enacting one’s role in accordance with that recognition and acknowledgement, so that its occurrence in one individual self and in society or social level as a whole reflects the condition of justice and proper order; in which based on that proper recognition and acknowledgement, one individual can position one-self properly, orderly, and hierarchically in relation to the spiritual, psychological-intellectual, physical, social, cosmic, and Divine level of realities (al-Attas, 1993: 105–106), in which all of those levels of realities construct — based on the unity principle in Islam — The Total Reality. The confusion and error in worldview, knowledge, and science thus will lead to the loss of discipline and order of one self in relation to The Total Reality, which reflects the loss of justice and individual as well as social ability to choose and make decision justly. In respect of the society and community, this loss of just order and hierarchy will enable false leaders to emerge and to thrive, causing the condition of more injustice, which will perpetuate this circular wicked condition since it ensures the continued emergence of leaders like them to replace them after they are gone, perpetuating the domination of false and evil leaders over the affairs of the Society and Community. The false and evil leaders refer to leaders in all organizational aspects and levels, not only political, but also family leaders, social leaders, religious leaders, academic and scholarly leaders, business and economical leaders, and leaders or person in charge or figure of authority in all fields, levels, and aspects of society and community who are not qualified for valid leadership of the Muslim Community and Society, i.e., leaders who do not possess the high moral, intellectual, and spiritual standards required for proper Islamic leadership (al-Attas, 1993: 106).

The Need of Presuppositions in Science

No phrase has ever engendered more misunderstanding and confusion in the world of scholars than the expression, “Science without Presuppositions.” It was coined originally by Theodor Mommsen, and was meant to express that scientific analysis and research must steer clear of every preconceived opinion. But it could not be, nor was it, intended to mean that scientific research needs no presuppositions at all. Scientific thought must link itself to something, and the big question is, where (Planck, 1950: 82). And in fact, if we take a closer look and scrutinize the edifice of exact science more intently, we must very soon become aware of the fact that it has a dangerously weak point — namely, its very foundation. Its foundation is not braced, reinforced properly, in every direction, so as to enable it to withstand external strains and stresses. In other words, exact science is not built on any principle of such universal validity, and at the same time of such portentous meaning, as to be fit to support the edifice properly. To be sure, exact science relies everywhere on exact measurements and figures, and is therefore fully entitled to bear its proud name, for the laws of logic and mathematics must undoubtedly be regarded as reliable. But even the keenest logic and the most exact mathematical calculation cannot produce a single fruitful result in the absence of a premise of unerring accuracy. (Planck, 1950: 81–82)

It is true that every branch of science must have an empirical foundation: but it is equally true that the essence of science does not consist in this raw material but in the manner in which it is used. The material always is incomplete: it consists of a number of parts which however numerous are discrete, and this equally true of the tabulated figures of the natural sciences, and of the various documents of the intellectual and social sciences. The material must therefore be completed, and this must be done by filling the gaps; and this in turn is done by means of associations of ideas; and in the case of Islamic science also, ultimately and more importantly, by the guidance of Revelations. And associations of ideas are not the work of the understanding but the offspring of the investigator’s imagination — an activity which may be described as faith, or more cautiously, as a working hypothesis. The essential point is that its content in one way or another goes beyond the data of experience. The chaos of individual masses cannot be wrought into a cosmos without some harmonizing force and, similarly, the disjointed data of experience can never furnish a veritable science without the intelligent interference of a spirit actuated by faith (Planck, 1963: 121–122). All matter originates and exists only by virtue of a force. We must assume behind this force the existence of a Conscious and Intelligent Mind. This Mind is the matrix of all matter (Planck, 1944). Therefore, Revelations must become the ultimate source of presuppositions in our philosophy of science.

The Nature of The Contemporary Philosophy of Science

However, contemporary science has evolved and developed out of a philosophy that since its earliest periods affirmed the coming into being of things out of each other. Everything existent is a progression, a development or evolution of what lies in latency in eternal matter. The world seen from this perspective is an independent, eternal universe; a self-subsistent system evolving according to its own laws. This denial of the reality of God is already implied in this philosophy. Its methods are chiefly philosophic rationalism, which tends to depend on reason alone without the aid of sense perception or experience; secular rationalism, which while accepting reason tends to rely more on sense experience, and denies authority and intuition and rejects Revelation and religion as sources of true knowledge; and philosophic empiricism or logical empiricism which bases all knowledge on observable facts, logical constructions and linguistic analysis (al-Attas, 1995: p. 115).

The vision of reality as seen according to the perspectives of both forms of rationalism and empiricism is based upon the restriction of reality to the natural world which is considered as the only level of reality. Such restriction follows from the reduction of the operational powers and capacities of the cognitive faculties and senses to the sphere of physical reality. In this system, knowledge is valid only as it pertains to the natural order of events and their relationships; and the purpose of inquiry is to describe and to systematize what happens in nature, by which is meant the totality of objects and events in space and time. The world of nature is described in plain naturalistic and rational terms divested of spiritual significance or of symbolic interpretation, reducing its origin and reality solely to mere natural forces (al-Attas, 1995: p. 115).

Rationalism, both the philosophic and the secular kind, and empiricism tend to deny authority and intuition as legitimate sources and methods of knowledge. Not that they deny the existence of authority and of intuition, but that they reduce authority and intuition to reason and experience. It is true that at the original instance in the case of both authority and intuition, there is always someone who experiences and who reasons; but it does not follow that because of this, authority and intuition should be reduced to reason and experience. If it is admitted that there are levels of reason and experience at the level of normal, human consciousness whose limitations are recognized, there is no reason to suppose that there are no higher levels of human experience and consciousness beyond the limits of normal reason and experience in which there are levels of intellectual and spiritual cognition and transcendental experience whose limits are known only to God (al-Attas, 1995: 116).

As to intuition, most rationalist, secularist and empiricist thinkers and psychologists have reduced it to sensory observations and logical inferences that have long been brooded over by the mind, whose meaning becomes suddenly apprehended, or to latent sensory and emotional build-ups which are released all of sudden in a burst of apprehension. But this is conjecture on their part, for there is no proof that the sudden flash of apprehension comes from sense experience; moreover, their denial of an intuitive faculty such as the heart, implied in their contention regarding intuition, is also conjectural. Since it is man that perceives and conceives the world of objects and events external to him, the study of nature includes man himself. But the study of man, of mind, and of the self is also restricted to the methods of new sciences such as psychology, biology, and anthropology, which regard man only as a further development of the animal species, and which are none other than methodological extensions of the restriction of reason and experience to the level of physical reality (al-Attas, 1995: 116).

The task of describing facts without respect for nonscientific considerations and of establishing the patterns of relations between them was originally formulated as a partial goal of bourgeois emancipation in its critical struggle against Scholastic restrictions upon research. But by the second half of the nineteenth century this definition had already lost its progressive character and showed itself to be, on the contrary, a limiting of scientific activity to the description, classification, and generalization of phenomena, with no care to distinguish the unimportant from the essential. The result of science, at least in part, may have been usefully applied in industry, but science evaded its responsibility when faced with the existential, individual, social, cultural, civilizational, and metaphysical problem of Total Reality as a whole (Horkheimer, 2002: 5). Reality in Islam is understood as ḥaqīqah, which encompasses all level of realities. A factual occurrence is only one aspect in many of ḥaqīqah. Moreover, a factual occurrence may be an actualization of something false (i.e., bāṭil); whereas reality is always the actualization of something true (i.e., ḥaqq). Thus, what is meant by ‘worldview’ according to the perspective of Islam is the vision of reality and truth that appears before mind’s eye revealing what the totality of existence is all about, i.e., vision of The Total Reality including the visible as well as the invisible worlds and the perspective of life as a whole (al-Attas, 1995: 1–2).

Moreover, in order to verify hypotheses and theories, science, according to Western civilization, requires correspondence with observable fact, and yet since hypotheses and theories that contradict one another can correspond with observable fact, and since the preference for one as against the other of them is not dictated by any criterion of objective truth — because truth itself is made to conform with fact — such preference is then dictated simply by subjective and arbitrary considerations dependent upon convention. This dependence upon convention has created the tendency to regard society, rather than the individual man, as ultimate, real, and authoritative. Conventionalism reduces all institutional forms as creations of the so called ‘collective mind’ of society. Knowledge itself, and even human language, are nothing but expressions and instruments of the collective mind of this unspeakable god called Society (al-Attas, 1995: p.116–117).

School education in the contemporary world is too intellectual and in-sufficiently humane. If we use the usual terms, we can say it is too technological and insufficiently classical. … In relation to civilization, technological education appears to be both its cause and its consequence. This type of education prepares a member for society, and all its aspects are shaped by that measure. This education is directed at a precise end and is interested in dominating nature, the external world. Classical education, on the contrary, begins and ends in man, being “aimlessly purposeful.” The dilemma of technological education versus classical education is not a technical but rather an ideological question. A certain specific philosophy lies behind it. … A non-industrial society will always be inclined toward classical education, while an industrial society, especially a socialist one, will tend toward the technological education. It is, of course, just a principle, suffering many deviations in practice. Still, the main tendency remains, being realized through the unavoidable corrections. … The logical sequence of a technological education is specialization. First of all, we can see that intelligence, science, and industry form one line and relate to each other as cause and consequence. Science is a result of intelligence, just as industry is only an applied science. They all are conditions and forms of man’s bearing in nature, in the external world. Specialization affords better and deeper setting of the individual in the social scheme, in the social mechanism. It degrades personality, but it promotes society and makes it more efficient. Society gets the capacity of the whole, while man becomes an ever-decreasing part of the social mechanism. The atomization of work and depersonalization of man as the working subject tend, in their progressive march, to the ideal state of utopia. … In communist countries, education consists of indoctrination in the ideological and political system of the state and is subordinated to its interests. In capitalist countries, education generally conforms to the economic requirements and serves the industrial system. In both cases, the education is functional, in the service of the system. This tendency prevails, despite flowery proclamations on the many-sided advances of man’s personality, on the humane character of education, and so on. (Izetbegovic, 1993: 50–52)

Difference Between Islam and Contemporary Science on The Nature of Process

From this secular positivistic, secular rationalistic, technological, and conventionalist view, we find that science in Western civilization has become very rigid. Rigidity in this case means that Western civilization is dominated by scientism. They become heavily influenced by science, extending it to the social and humanities realms, and making it their guide in life. Western civilization has applied rationalism and empiricism, namely the approaches and investigations methods of the natural sciences, to other fields such as humanities and social sciences. Then the influence of science in their thinking is so great and profound that science is made as if it were a major life value to guide them towards prosperity. They forget that science is only a utility tool for mankind; and tools cannot serve as the value of life (al-Attas, 2001: 42).

The rigidity in contemporary science can also be known from the view of contemporary science that process is the basic nature of reality. Since modern philosophy and science have come to realize that the fundamental nature of phenomena is process, the descriptive names that philosophers and scientists have applied to correspond with process must also reflect the dynamism involved in the very idea of process. They have applied such names as ‘life’ or ‘vital impulse’, or ‘energy’, implying the movement, the change, the becoming that are productive of the events in space-time. That they have chosen these names as descriptive of the reality manifested as process is itself an indication that they consider existence, unlike life, vital impulse, or energy, as a mere concept; and as a mere concept existence is indeed something static, clearly disqualifying it as corresponding with process. In this sense, their formulation of a philosophy of science, in contradiction with their position that the reality underlying phenomena is process, still revolves within the sphere of an essentialistic worldview, a worldview preoccupied with ‘things’ having independent and self-subsistent ‘essences’, and of events, relations, and concepts pertaining to the things, making things point to themselves as the sole reality, and not to any other Reality beyond them that both includes as well as excludes them (al-Attas, 1995: 127–128).

This worldview, which considers that the reality behind the phenomena is process, will formulate a philosophy of science which views that the meaning of the system of reality is contained in the process; and that in that process there are systemic patterns, provisions, and laws that they think never change, so they are static. In this way, the notion that considers the meaning of reality as a process will contradictively form a philosophy of science that holds an essentialistic view of nature, which considers that everything in nature is a collection of systems and subsystems that operate according to the provisions that exist within themselves and accumulatively point to themselves as one and only reality, a macro-system of itself that operates according to its own provisions, and negates the existence of other Reality beyond them which simultaneously includes them and is different from them, Capable of dynamically Influencing, Acting, even Controlling at any moment, everything in the universe so that the universe does not always go according to the “usual pattern” that science attributes to the system’s process.

The Islamic position is that what is truly descriptive of the fundamental nature of phenomena as process is ‘existence’ because existence alone, both understood as a concept as well as a reality, is the most basic and universal entity known to us. It is true that existence understood as a concept is static and does not correspond with process. But we maintain that existence is not merely a concept, it is also a reality: it is not merely posited in the mind, but is also a real and actual entity independent of the mind. It is dynamic, active, creative, and pregnant with infinite possibilities of ontological self-expression; it is an aspect of God that arises from the intrinsic nature of His names and attributes, and is therefore a ‘conscious’ entity acting in accordance with God’s customary way of acting (sunnat Allāh). The so-called “laws of nature” are in reality God’s customary way of acting, and understood as such, these “laws” are no longer seen as rigid because they are now open to infinite possibilities. Existence is then the primary, ultimate stuff of reality, whereas life, vital impulse, or energy and other such terms applied by philosophers and scientists to describe that fundamental entity, which is the reality underlying the nature of things, are all secondary to existence for they all are like properties or attributes of existence (al-Attas, 1995: 128).

Difference Between Islam and Contemporary Science on Social Reality

Horkheimer also admits that there is rigidity in contemporary Western science and that this rigidity is due to mechanical view of nature and that mechanistic thinking is not suitable to be applied to human and social realities. Scientific method was oriented towards the essentialistic view of nature as a macro-system with static processes, laws, and patterns; and the form of society at the time was regarded as a mechanism which ran in an unvarying fashion, i.e., linear evolution towards secular modern scientific society (Russel, 1951: 35–37). The mechanism might be disturbed for a shorter or longer period, but in any event, it did not require a different scientific approach than did the explanation of any complicated piece of machinery. Yet social reality, the development of men acting in history, has a fix structure as well as dynamic aspect. The structure as well as the dynamism in the social reality are not to be mastered by simply recording events as they occur, which was the method practiced in old-style natural science. (Horkheimer, 2002: 5)

Even though contemporary Western science which is mechanistic and deterministic is rigid, paradoxically when it is extended to the realm of the social-humanities, it does not have a fixed foundation and guide, because its rigidity in viewing processes and changes as the basic nature of social reality makes it view that change is permanent thing; even though humans live in need of guidance and foundation, namely that society has a proportional division between what must remain unchanged and what must and can change. Different from the natural world or material nature which continually experiences generation and corruption, within human beings there is an element of the soul which requires a permanent mooring. The Western natural science method cannot provide a permanent guide to human and social life, because it is based on the assumption that processes and changes are the basic nature of reality. It has led Western civilization to deny the existence of fixed values, foundations, and guidelines, so that they are immersed in a constant search. Western civilization and society thus reflect a civilization and society which is always becoming but never being (al-Attas, 2001: 21).

Science, as limited only to rational and empirical aspects, cannot solve the ultimate mystery of nature because we ourselves are part of nature and therefore part of the mystery that we are trying to solve (Planck, 1913: 27). Empirical science has limitations to understand the internal aspects of human consciousness, especially about the soul which is not a material object. Science thus brings us to the threshold of the ego and there leaves us to ourselves. Here it resigns us to the care of other hands. In the conduct of our own lives the causal principle is of little help; for by the iron law of logical consistency we are excluded from laying the causal foundations of our own future or foreseeing that future as definitely resulting from the present. But mankind has need of fundamental postulates for the conduct of everyday existence, and this need is far more pressing than the hunger for scientific knowledge. A single deed often has far more significance for a human being than all the wisdom of the world put together. And therefore, there must be another source of guidance than mere intellectual equipment. The law of causation is the guiding rule of science; but the Categorical Imperative — that is to say, the dictate of duty — is the guiding rule of life. Here scientific knowledge has to give place to religion (Planck, 1913: 167–168).

Different from Western science, civilization, and society, once the spirit of the Islamic revelation had been brought into being, out of the heritage of previous civilizations and through its own genius, the science, civilization, and society whose manifestations may be called distinctly Islamic, the main interest turned away from change and “adaptation”. The arts and sciences, civilization, and society came to possess instead a stability and a “crystallization” based on the immutability of the principles from which they had issued forth: it is this stability that is too often mistaken in the West today for stagnation and sterility. (Nasr, 2001: 21) In Western philosophy, we almost always find the view that progress can be achieved only if humans free themselves from religious thoughts. That is why they then left the scriptures. And because basically they put aside their transcendental references, they then lose ground and guidance. We see that they later fell into various schools of thought and philosophies with which they actually became shackled, especially by the determinism and mechanism. (Kuntowijoyo, 2007: 120–121) Contemporary social and human sciences that do not have a definite, permanent, and generally accepted foundation and guide will bring problems and confusion to mankind, especially when exported outside of Western society and civilization (Kuntowijoyo, 2007: 38). What’s more, the concept of change in Islam is not the same as the Western idea of progress. The West considers that there is no role of God in change, while the Islamic concept of change sees God as the Entity to Him All Determination of Affairs Returns (Quran [2]: 210) (Kuntowijoyo, 2018: 15).

The Need for Metaphysics

The refusal of science to handle in an appropriate way the problems connected with the social process has led to superficiality in method and content, and this superficiality, in turn, has found expression in the neglect of dynamic relationships between the various areas with which science deals, while also affecting in quite varied ways the practice of the disciplines. Connected with this narrowing of scientific purview is the fact that a set of unexplicated, rigid, and fetishistic concepts can continue to play a role, when the real need is to throw light on them by relating them to the dynamic movement of events. Some examples: the concept of the self-contained consciousness as the supposed generator of science; the person and his world-positing reason; the eternal natural law, dominating all events; the unchanging relationship of subject and object; the rigid distinction between mind and nature, soul and body, individual and social, and other categorical formulations. (Horkheimer, 2002: 6) In contrast to contemporary science, Islam views all levels of reality as an integral part. It has been explained previously that Islam views humans as microcosmic representations of the macrocosm, so that they can view the human soul, human mind, body and material, individual, society, nature, cosmos, and — most importantly — God as an integral Total Reality.

Since around the turn of the century scientists and philosophers have pointed out the insufficiencies and unsuitability of purely mechanistic methods. The criticism has led to discussion of the principles involved in the main foundations on which research rests, so that today we may speak of a crisis within science. This inner crisis is now added to the external dissatisfaction with science as a means of production which has not been able to meet expectations in alleviating the general need. Modern physics has in large measure overcome within its own field the deficiencies of the traditional method and has revised its critical foundations. On the other hand, the modern interpretation of atomic events has very little resemblance to genuine materialistic philosophy; in fact, one may say that atomic physics has turned science away from the materialistic trend it had during the nineteenth century (Heisenberg, 1971: 58). It is to the credit of metaphysics that it has once again turned the attention of science as a whole to numerous neglected areas and prepared the way at many points for a method less hindered by conventional narrowness of outlook. Above all, the description of important psychic phenomena, the delineation of social types, and the founding of a sociology of knowledge have had fruitful results. (Horkheimer, 2002: 6) However, in order to heal the social and human sciences from the influence of secular positivism, secular rationalism, behaviorism and deterministic mechanisms, we must base science, especially social and human sciences, on true metaphysics in accordance with Islamic teachings. But how do we relate metaphysics, which so far generally only discusses abstract matters, with more “concrete” discussions of natural science and social science?

Unfortunately, so far metaphysical studies have not considered society as reality. Metaphysics deals more with the human soul and individual self, while assuming that society is only a concept, not reality. Metaphysics being operated falsely thereby turned its back on the causes of the social crisis and even downgraded the means of investigating it. It introduced a new confusion of its own by hypostatizing isolated, abstractly conceived man and thereby belittling the importance of a theoretical comprehension of social reality (Horkheimer, 2002: 7). However, Islam never dichotomize between the “abstract” and the “concrete”, or between individual men and society, and so on. Just as the individual is considered in the Islamic conception as a reality, society is also a reality. In fact, if we examine the Islamic conception, society — especially that which is understood in terms of neighbors (especially within a radius of 40 houses), ummah (ummah), leadership, and khilāfah, and so on — is considered reality.

So that this article is not too long, of course the statement that society is reality needs to be proven in other writings. What is clear is that we need an analysis of the links between the layers of reality: the Reality of God (Divine level); cosmic reality (cosmic level); the reality of revelation; the reality of the soul and intellect (psychological-intellectual level); and individual reality (individual, physical, and biological levels); with socio-cultural realities and civilization. For this reason, systemic discussions, namely relational analysis through a systems approach have the potential to be used, because systemology is a heuristic-philosophical-technical study that can engage with and can be used to link between heuristic, ideological, philosophical, paradigmatic and worldview elements in science and elements that are more rational-empirical and technical (Rousseau, 2018: 7–10). In this way, we can formulate a construct and structure of science that is not neutral and is clearly permeated and influenced by the metaphysical system that projects our paradigm and worldview.

Meta-Scientific Aspects of Science in the Lakatos and Kuhn Models

In carrying out the agenda of de-Westernization of science and the Islamization of science, thus, we believe that science and knowledge in general are not neutral, but contain influences from a metaphysical system, natural views, paradigms and certain values of the civilization that developed them (al-Attas, 1995: ix). Horkheimer also admits that science is ideological (Horkheimer, 2002: 7). Simply put, there are doctrinal elements in science (Planck, 1913: 44–45; Lakatos, 1989: 3–4 & 48–49). In addition, science can be considered as a cluster of research programs that can compete with each other to become the dominant research program, dominant paradigm, or normal science. Each research program contains a collection of auxiliary laws, theories and hypotheses which are based on ‘doctrinaire’ elements, whether they are referred to as Hard Core in Imre Lakatos’s model, or paradigms in Thomas Kuhn’s model.

In Lakatos’ conception, the descriptive unit of science in a falsification is not a single hypothesis, but a research program, which is a package of principles, laws, theories, and hypotheses in a field of science. Science consists of a collection of research programs, each of which has a structure centered on a hard core. The hard core consists of certain basic principles or laws that cannot be changed and protected from disprovation / falsification by a protective belt composed of auxiliary theories and hypotheses. The protective belt connects the hard core to observational data and a range of methodologies and interpretations of them. A collection of such structures forms a research program. A collection of subsequent research programs cumulatively forms a field of science. (Lakatos, 1989: 3–4) With this structure, the hard core is not tested directly when scientists make observations and find data that becomes an anomaly for the hard core of their research program. Instead, scientists are trying to figure out how hard cores can be made compatible with observations by modifying their protective belts. No amount of observation can falsify a hard core, because by itself, a hard core predicts nothing. To make empirical predictions from it, we need various auxiliary hypotheses in the protective belt to relate it to empirical reality. (Lakatos, 1989: 48)

Lakatos’ idea of a ‘research program’ is actually similar to Kuhn’s concept of a ‘paradigm’ in a broader sense, but the key concept is different: there is more than one research program in a field of science in a period of normal science. The scientific process on a large scale can be interpreted as a competition between these different paradigms to become a widely agreed upon paradigm and shift the old paradigm (paradigm shift). However, different from Kuhn who considers that paradigm shifts occur irrationally, related to the concept of the Gestalt Switch, Lakatos views that a shift from one research program to another occurs when the new research program is able to accommodate anomalies better than its competitor. (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, h.102–103)

Lakatos Research Program, Systemology, and Islamic Science

Among the various schools of philosophy of science in the West, the one most in line with the Islamization of science approach developed by Naquib al-Attas and his students, at least according to Adi Setia and Hamid Fahmy Zarkasyi, is the philosophy of science of Imre Lakatos, which is a combination and modification of Karl Popper’s falsification and Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm concepts, and offers a middle way between the Popper school which is too objective and Paul Feyerabend’s understanding which is too anarchist. (Setia, 2016: h.50) The intersection of the concept of Islamic science and the Islamization of science with Imre Lakatos’s philosophy of science lies in the assumption about the structure of science, that there is a ‘contemplative’ element in science that influences the way scientists interpret empirical facts. Some of these elements are dogmatic and cannot be changed. In Islamic science, it is called a worldview, while Lakatos calls it Hard Core. The deepest structure is ‘connected’ with empirical facts by a modifiable ‘middle layer’. Lakatos calls it the Protective Belt, while in Islamic science, this layer is parallel to Kuhn’s scientific paradigm concept. (Setia, 2016: 52–55; Zarkasyi, 2016: 14)

Furthermore, the worldview of Islam contains the most fundamental concepts formulated from Revelations, which include the concepts of God, nature, science, soul, human being, manners, society, and their various derivatives. These fundamental concepts are then derived to formulate a theoretical paradigm (covering aspects of ontology, epistemology, axiology, methodology, rhetoric, and so on). (Zarkasyi, 2016: 12–13) With such a structure, the application of the modified model of the Lakatos’ research program in the formulation of the structure of Islamic science is compatible with the typical systemological architecture in the system building philosophy tradition, in which the scientific process is divided into four stages: 1) systems philosophy, which produces basic concepts and the paradigmatic models that underlie a research; 2) systems science, which produces knowledge that tends to be empirical, practical, and experimental in nature; 3) systems engineering, which produces designs and prototypes of social and technical products that are expected to be useful in solving practical field problems; and 4) systems implementation, where the product designs that have been obtained are applied to become solutions to various field problems. Worldview and paradigm aspects are included in the philosophical stages of science and produce the principles that underlie the following stages. (Rousseau, 2018: 7)

From this, we can see that each stage in the process of the scientific field — from the stages of philosophy, science, engineering, and practice — has its own specialization, role, and outcome, but are connected and inseparable through common interrelated foundations and principles between each stage. Each phase in the scientific process is based on the achievements of the previous stage. The results of the previous phase are processed into principles that can be used to develop methods for the next phase. For example, the main concepts elaborated in the philosophical stages (worldview and paradigm) can be used for the derivation of scientific research principles. Explanatory theories obtained from scientific research can be processed into explanatory principles which, apart from being used to explain empirical phenomena, can also be developed into design principles that can be used by engineers to build product designs, both technical and social. The design results from the engineering stage can be used for the derivation of application principles and interventions that can be used at a practical stage, including fields that have broad influences in public life and the environment. (Rousseau, 2018: 9) (See also previous article)

With such a structure, it can be said that each stage forms the principle that underlies the next stage and each stage has its own principles. Philosophical methods rely on principles. The existence of solutions to the physical and social worlds can also be translated into principles. These principles link the investigation of a scientific discipline with the social reality and order. Then, each stage of a scientific field inherits the principles produced from the previous phase, as well as the principles and methods that produce output from that field, so that there is a cumulative development of principles and methods from the previous stage to the next, from the more metaphysical phase to the more empirical phase. However, it is not uncommon for investigations in a scientific discipline to start from a more right stage (more physical and practical) to a more left (more metaphysical and contemplative) stage, which is referred to as the heuristic design process. (Rousseau, 2018: 10)

In fact, both directions, the scientific path and the heuristic path, can be used in efforts to formulate Islamic science. The heuristic path can be used to review the practical and engineering implementation of a science product, then proceed to evaluate scientific research programs, continue to the philosophical realm to evaluate elements of scientific disciplines that originate from a secular view of nature and are contrary to Islamic natural views, to then being isolated, filtered, and repealed, and alternatives are sought from Islamic sources; a process known as the de-secularization of science or the de-westernization of science. Meanwhile, the scientific path that starts from the philosophical field (covering worldviews, paradigms, basic principles of science, presuppositions, and underlying thoughts) and continue towards the realm of engineering and practice, is an effort to Islamize science, namely incorporating values, principles, and various Islamic elements into contemporary science. The formulation of such a system of philosophy of science is in accordance with the understanding of the De-westernization of Science and the Islamization of Science given by al-Attas (al-Attas, 1993: 162–163).

Crisis in Science and Necessary Critical Evaluation

At the present time, scientific effort mirrors an economy filled with contradictions. The economy is in large measure dominated by monopolies, and yet on the world scale it is disorganized and chaotic, richer than ever yet unable to eliminate human wretchedness. Science, too, shows a double contradiction. First, science accepts as a principle that its every step has a critical basis, yet the most important step of all, the setting of tasks, lacks a theoretical grounding and seems to be taken arbitrarily. Second, science has to do with a knowledge of comprehensive relationships; yet, it has no realistic grasp of that comprehensive relationship between Divine Reality, psychological-intellectual reality, individual reality, social reality, and cosmic reality, which altogether constitute Total Reality, which necessitate a harmonization and integration between God, cosmos, intellect, mind, self, and society. The two contradictions are closely connected. (Horkheimer, 2002: 8)

Thus, it can be said that science and human knowledge in general are currently experiencing a crisis due to the rigid dualism and partiality inherent in science and contemporary philosophy of science. To overcome this crisis, Western science and scientific philosophy must undergo a thorough evaluation through the prism of Islamic views as the evaluation standard. Modern philosophy has become the interpreter of science, and organizes the results of the natural and social sciences into a world view. The interpretation in turn determines the direction which science is to take in its study of nature. It is this interpretation of the statements and general conclusions of science and the direction of science along the lines suggested by the interpretation that must be subjected to critical evaluation, as they pose for us today the most profound problems that have confronted us generally in the course of our religious and intellectual history. Our evaluation must entail a critical examination of the methods of modern science; its concepts, presuppositions, and symbols; its empirical and rational aspects, and those impinging upon values and ethics; its interpretation of origins; its theory of knowledge; its presuppositions on the existence of an external world, of the uniformity of nature, and of the rationality of natural process; its theory of the universe; its classification of the sciences; its limitations and inter-relations with one another of the sciences, and its social relations (al-Attas, 1995: 113–114).

In so far as we can rightly speak of a crisis in science, that crisis is inseparable from the general crisis within contemporary men and society due to the secularization process, which includes disenchantment of nature, de-consecration of values, and desacralization of public life. Contemporary zeitgeist has limited science only as rational-empirical inquiry or as productive force, so that the scientific process and science education negates revelation and metaphysics and even completely ignores the philosophy of science. These show in the various sectors of science, in their content and form, in their subject matter and method. Furthermore, the function of science as interpretation of God’s signs in nature, society, and individuals / self has not been properly applied. Understanding of the crisis of science depends on a correct theory of the present philosophical, individual and social situation; for science as a whole reflects at present the contradictions and disharmony within contemporary philosophy, self, and society. (Horkheimer, 2002: 9)

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